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DEDICATION 
This project is dedicated to all of the women that I met on my journey through the 
federal justice system and to all of the men and women who I did not meet, but who have 
had the same experiences. Our experiences were the motivation for this project. 
Regardless of our status as felons or ex-felons, many of us work very hard, pay our taxes 
and are actively contributing to society and should have a voice. If we live in a state that 
silences that voice and we want change, then we need to better understand why it is 
happening. 
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ABSTRACT 
With 6.1M potential votes affected, felon disenfranchisement policies clearly 
have far reaching effects on the composition of the federal, state, and local governments 
in our nation, and so they continue to be a point of contention in the US. Some of the 
current literature is written from a criminal justice perspective with focuses on the 
policy’s impact on reintegration and recidivism, but much of the research is politically 
oriented, some even questioning the status of our democracy. Though there have been 
many challenges, the perspective of the federal government is that the practice is 
Constitutionally sound, leaving it up to the states to determine policy and resulting in a 
wide variety of policies. Political factors such as citizen ideology, party competition, and 
especially political culture have a significant impact on the level of restrictiveness of a 
states felon voting policies. Further, Lieske’s new measure of political culture 
outperforms the older Elazar/Sharkansky measure in predicting the severity of felon 
disenfranchisements policies.  
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CHAPTER 1.    INTRODUCTION 
Felony disenfranchisement, the restriction on voting rights of felons, affects 6.1 million 
Americans (Chung, 2017). Restrictions vary from state to state, ranging from no restrictions at 
all (in Vermont and Maine even individuals currently incarcerated can vote) to permanent 
disenfranchisement. According to The Sentencing Project, only 23% of Americans who are 
disenfranchised are incarcerated (Chung, 2017). The remaining 77% are tax paying citizens, 
living in their communities either on probation, parole, or having completed their sentence. The 
current literature on felony disenfranchisement encompasses a wide variety of focuses. While 
there are a few articles that support the practice, overwhelmingly the literature tends to highlight 
negative impacts which support its abandonment. Some of the literature is written from a 
criminal justice perspective with focuses on the policy’s impact on reintegration and recidivism. 
But much of the research is politically oriented, some even questioning the status of our 
democracy. Ruth, Matusitz & Simi (2016, p. 57) states that “limited access to political 
participation for certain classes of citizens is equivalent to social injustice and results in an 
illegitimate democracy”. 
Constitutional Challenges 
Despite this, the federal government’s perspective is that felon disenfranchisement is 
Constitutionally sound. It is supported by a 1974 Supreme Court ruling that convicted felons 
could be banned from voting without violating the Fourteenth Amendment due to the clause in 
Section 2 which reduces a state’s representation in Congress if it has denied citizens the right to 
vote except in the case of “rebellion, or other crime” (Hinchcliff, 2011). While material in 
support of felony disenfranchisement is very difficult to find, Sigler (2014, p. 1727) addresses 
the fact that “the debate is…one-sided”, that “scholarly and popular literature is overwhelmingly 
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hostile to the practice”, and attempts to lay out a case for a type of disenfranchisement that she 
thinks is “consistent with the values of a modern liberal democracy”. Sigler argues that crime is a 
“breach of civic trust” (2014, p. 1744), and that offenders should lose their right to vote during 
their incarceration and for four years after their release but that there should be a process for the 
restoration of rights. She further argues that the restoration process should be thoroughly 
explained to the offender upon their release from prison, that it should not cost anything, and that 
the process should be “ministerial rather than discretionary” (2014, p. 1744). 
However, Hinchcliff (2011) agrees with Ruth, Matusitz & Simi (2016), stating that the 
courts “expansive interpretation…is constitutionally suspect…” and arguing that the words 
preceding “or other crime” provide an “interpretive frame” for the phrase. She points to three 
other clauses which contain similar wording, the Extradition Clause, the Grand Jury Clause, and 
the Impeachment clause, and states that “the ‘Other crime’ exception is consistently interpreted 
with reference to the enumerated offence” and in this case is limited by its paradigm term 
‘rebellion’” (Hinchcliff, 2011). Another challenge to the constitutionality of the policy is the fact 
that the 15th Amendment essentially repealed Section 2 of the 14th Amendment (Camilli, 2011). 
Because Section 2 still allowed for voting discrimination at the cost of reduced representation in 
Congress, the 15th Amendment was written to automatically re-enfranchise the affected 
individuals and, according to Camilli, since “Section 2’s penalty can never be executed, its 
implied repeal is demonstrated” (2011, p. 245).  
Hamilton-Smith and Vogel (2012) discuss the idea of felony disenfranchisement as cruel 
and unusual punishment. In the U.S. Supreme Court case Troy v. Dulles, which was a court 
concerning the Nationality Act of 1940 and the constitutionality of the expatriation of military 
members court-martialed for desertion, part of the ruling determined that disenfranchisement was 
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civil penalty and not a criminal punishment. If disenfranchisement is not considered a 
punishment, then it cannot be challenged under the Eight Amendment (Hamilton-Smith & 
Vogel, 2012). However, Hamilton-Smith and Vogel (2012) go on to highlight two critiques of 
the Court’s determination that disenfranchisement is not punishment. First, they point out that 
the two cases the Court based its opinion on are “antiquated views of what the right to vote 
represents” (2012, p. 421). Their second argument is a bit more complicated. The Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of felony disenfranchisement by citing the 14th Amendment which 
was passed by the 39th Congress. That same 39th Congress included in the laws readmitting the 
Southern states to the Union a stipulation that the states not alter their constitution to deny voting 
rights “except as punishment for such crimes as are now felonies at common law” (2012, p. 421). 
Hamilton-Smith and Vogel (2012) interpret this as meaning that the 39th Congress only believed 
disenfranchisement as acceptable as a form of punishment and not as a regulatory measure. If the 
Supreme Court has determined that disenfranchisement is not a punishment but a regulatory 
measure, then it is unconstitutional in terms of what the 39th Congress intended (Hamilton-Smith 
& Vogel, 2012).  
Several other cases that have been heard by the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have 
brought challenges under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) (Hamilton-Smith & Vogel, 
2012). These cases generally claim that the disproportionate number of felony arrests of 
minorities result in disproportionate a number of disenfranchised minorities but the Ninth 
Circuit, in which a number of these cases were heard, stated that the plaintiffs must show that the 
state’s justice system “is infected by intentional discrimination or that the felon 
disenfranchisement law was enacted with such intent” (Hamilton-Smith & Vogel, 2012, p. 420) 
Since none of these challenges have been successful at the federal level, it is left up to the states 
4 
to determine their policy on felon voting restrictions. This has left us with a variety of 
approaches to felon disenfranchisement policies, and while one may expect attitudes toward 
criminality and citizenship to drive them, some scholars argue that they are based on other factor 
such as race.  
Racial Implications 
The idea that felony disenfranchisement has a disproportionate impact on racial 
minorities is grounded in its origins. Goldman (2004, p. 625) states that “felon voting restrictions 
were the first widespread set of legal disenfranchisement measures imposed on African 
Americans”. Interestingly, while the non-white percentage of the prison population doubled from 
1850 to 1870, the number of states with felony disenfranchisement laws went from just over 50 
percent in 1861 to 87 percent in 1876 (Goldman, 2004). Bowers and Preuhs (2009) investigate 
the impact felony disenfranchisement laws have on the habits of non-felon voters and find that 
strict policies result in lower likelihood of voting in blacks, but not in non-Hispanic whites, 
further diluting the minority vote.  
Behrens, Uggen & Manza (2003) conduct an analysis of the “origins and evolution” of 
these laws across states, finding that the racial makeup of a state’s prisons is associated with its 
adoption of felon disenfranchisement laws with states having larger non-white prison population 
more likely to ban felons from voting. Preuhs (2001) also investigates the impact of race on 
disenfranchisement policy. Even after controlling for a variety of other explanations such as 
ideology, party competition, legislative professionalism, and overall education he finds that race 
remains the primary factor in the restrictiveness of disenfranchisement policies (Preuhs, 2001). 
Both of these studies came in the wake of the controversial 2000 presidential election. Preuhs 
(2001, p. 733) claims that his study “raises important questions regarding the future of minority 
participation in the democratic process”. While they are not without critics, many have argued 
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that the votes lost by the enormous population of disenfranchised felons would have had a 
pivotal impact on the election.  
Participation and Elections 
Thomas J. Miles (2004) rejects the idea that disenfranchisement has an effect on voter 
turnout asserting that felons belong to groups that typically do not exercise their right to vote 
even when they are eligible. He uses a triple-differences strategy to compare voter turnout of 
African-American males to white males and to females in states that do and do not permanently 
disenfranchise and finds that the effect of felon disenfranchisement on voter turnout for African-
American males is not statistically significant (Miles, 2004). Miles (2004) makes two 
suggestions as to why no effect is seen in voter turnout rates when large portions of the 
population are disqualified: a) disenfranchised felons come from a portion of the population that 
would not vote anyway, and b) there is a laxity of enforcement, in other words, disenfranchised 
felons register and vote anyway, and no one prevents it. 
In contrast, Uggen and Manza (2002) estimate that an average of 35 percent of 
disenfranchised felons would have turned out to vote in presidential elections from 1972 to 2002 
and that 24 percent would have turned to vote in senatorial elections in that same time frame. 
Their method involves looking at the behavior of non-felons and assuming that it will be similar 
to that of felons with similar characteristics.  They look at race, education, gender, marital status, 
job status, and age and use regression analysis to determine the turnout of felons and ex-felons 
(Uggen & Manza, 2002). They also make predictions on party preferences and use both of these 
findings to conclude that the outcomes of seven senatorial elections and at least one presidential 
election have been altered by felony disenfranchisement (Uggen & Manza, 2002).   
Hjalmarsson and Lopez (2010) call the methods of the previous two studies “detective 
work” and conducts a more straightforward study, comparing two data sets that contain 
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information on criminality and voter participation. They find that, in the 2004 election, 40 
percent of ever arrested individuals and 26 percent of ever incarcerated individuals voted if 
eligible, and compared that to 61 percent of non-arrested and 57 percent of non-incarcerated 
individuals who voted to determine that criminals are less likely to vote than non-criminals 
(Hjalmarsson & Lopez, 2010). Based on these findings, Hjalmarsson and Lopez (2010) agree 
with Uggen and Manza (2002), despite the critique of their methods, that if disenfranchised 
individuals would have been able to vote, Gore would have won the electoral college in the 2000 
election. While Hjalmarsson and Lopez (2010) concede that in a typical presidential election the 
disenfranchised population could only make about a 1 percent difference in the outcome, the 
prominent role played by Florida, which had a dispropotianately large population of 
disenfranchised voters had a more pivotal impact. 
Political Culture 
Felon disenfranchisement is clearly an important issue as it has an impact on our 
elections and in turn, on the democratic functioning of our nation. Therefore, it is more critical 
than ever to understand the factors that determine these state level policies, and why there is such 
dramatic variation between them. With Behrens, Uggen, and Manza (2003) and Preuhs (2001) 
having firmly established that the orgins of diesenfranchisement policies are related to race, 
Murphy, Newmark, & Ardoin (2006) investigate what factors drive the likelihood of a state 
deciding to expand or limit those current policies. They examine political factors such as 
ideology, party competition, and political culture, as well as demographic variables such as size 
of minority population and prison population, age, education level, and urbanization and find that 
while ideology and urbanization levels are significant factors, a state’s political culture is the 
most important factor in understanding felon disenfranchisenment policies (Murphy, Newmark, 
& Ardoin, 2006). At the state and local levels of governement, political culture dicatates what the 
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purpose of goverenment is, who is allowed to participate, and how it is practiced (Leckrone, 
2013). The latter two of these relate directly to felon disenfranchisment. 
Elazar (1984), initially publishing in 1966 but with later revisions, classifies states as 
either moralistic, individualistic, or traditionalistic. Sharkansky (1969) described these as being 
along a continuum with moralism and traditionalism on each end and individualism residing 
somwhere in between. The moralistic culture is one in which all citizens are expected to 
participate for the good of the entire community while in an individualistic culture, participation 
is looked to be a way of pursuing one’s own interests, and in a traditionalistic culture 
participation is something reserved for elites. Further, moralistic culture encourages the 
intervention of government in society in order to promote the “greater good”, while 
individualistic culture seeks to minimize it, and the traditionalistic culture opposes all 
goverenment interaction unless it serves to maintain their power. One would expect, then, that 
states with a moralistic culture would have the least amount of restritions on felon voting as they 
believe in the highest amount of participation, while states with traditionalistic culture would 
have more restrictions since they seek to restrict participation and support government action that 
would serve this end.  
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CHAPTER 2.    THEORY OF THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL CULTURE 
Elazar defined political culture as “the particular pattern or orientation to political action 
in which each political system is embedded” (1984, p. 109). Elazar is not alone in advancing the 
idea of political cutlure as an explanation for policy output. According to Koven and Mausolff 
(2002) works by Fischer and Garreau, similar to Elazar, also use migratory patterns to establish 
political culture classifications in the US. Wildavsky (1987) advanced the idea that political 
culture drives political preferences, developing four categories that vary in two dimensions 
which are “based on answers to the questons: Who am I? and What shall I do?”. 
There are many more who have investigated the relevance of political culture, however, 
Elazar has retained prominence in the field even after being subjected to more than 100 empirical 
studies (Lieske, 1993). Elazar’s (1984) classification has been used to explain various types of 
policy output, partisanship and election results, and even how elections function. Wirt, Mitchell, 
& Marshall (1985) (1988) and Heck, Lam, & Thomas (2014) apply political culture to education 
policy. Mead (2004) looks at the relationship between welfare reform policy and political 
culture. In addition to felon voting policies, it has also been used to explain other aspects of 
criminal justice policy such as sentence severity (Broach, Jackson, & Ascolillio, 1978). Erikson, 
McIver, & Wright (1987) find that culture is independent of and more important than 
demographics in explaining differences in public opinion on regarding partisanship and ideology. 
Finally, Carman & Barker (2005) examine the relationship between political culture and the 
scheduling of state primary elections. 
Elazar 
Elazar (1984) identified a dominant culture for each state and each of 228 regional 
designations, and theorized that these cultures were a result of westward expansion with 
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migratory patterns driving the preference for a particular culture. The “orientation to political 
action” referenced earlier as Elazar’s definition of political culture he further argues could be 
found in both elected officials and the general public (Sharkansky, 1969). It is important to note 
that there is a distinction between political culture and political ideology. As mentioned 
previously, political culture relates to the perceived role of government in society. It determines 
when and how it is appropriate for the government to act and who should be participating in the 
action while political ideology relates to the type of action taken, and generally ranges on a 
continuum with liberalism and conservativism at the two ends of the spectrum. While Elazar’s 
political cultures have been referred to as “conceptual, rather than empirically driven” (Heck, 
Lam, & Thomas, 2014) and reflective of Elazar’s judgement (Sharkansky, 1969), they have 
generally been accepted to accurately describe the perceived role and preferences of state and 
regional governments.  
Traditionalistic 
 According to Elazar (1984), traditionalists view the government as a tool to “maintain the 
existing order”. They are disdainful of the bureaucracy and believing it should be controlled by 
the political elites. Similarly, traditionalists believe that only the elite should participate in 
politics. Political parties are not important to traditionalists and competition exists between inter-
party factions. Elazar (1984) essentially describes the culture as archaic, stating it is societies that 
retain “some of the…preindustrial social order”.  
Individualistic 
 Elazar (1984) describes the individualistic view of the government as a “marketplace” 
with its purpose being to respond to demands and advance economic development. They see the 
bureaucracy as a necessary evil which limits patronage, but advances efficiency. Individualists 
believe politics should be left to the professionals and that political parties exist to “dole out 
10 
favors”. Competition is therefore partisan since the control of office means the control of favors 
(Elazar, Amerian Federalism: A View from the States, Third Edition, 1984). 
Moralistic 
 The moralistic culture views government as a “commonwealth”, existing to improve the 
community and act in the best interest of the public (Elazar, Amerian Federalism: A View from 
the States, Third Edition, 1984). They favor a meritocratic bureaucracy, believing it encourages 
political neutrality. Everyone should participate in politics as it is “every citizen’s responsibility, 
according to the moralist, with competition being over valid issues rather than between 
individuals (Elazar, Amerian Federalism: A View from the States, Third Edition, 1984). 
Overlap: Subcultures 
 Elazar (1984) did not claim that particular regions would adhere to only one of these 
cultures. He recognized that over time particular events impact migration patterns, weakening 
some and strengthening others. He notes that this would also impact the “relative position of the 
various groups in the community” (Elazar, 1984, p. 123). He represented this overlap when he 
developed his regional map of political culture (see Fig 1). Where two cultures enmesh in a 
particular region, they are represented accordingly. M, MT, MI, I, IM, IT, T, TM, TI are the nine 
designations that appear on his regional map. He then argued that “aggregations of cultural 
patterns are clearly discernable in every state” (Elazar, 1984, p. 134) and developed a map of the 
dominant political cultures by state (see Fig. 2). 
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Figure 1: The regional distribution of political culture within the United States (Elazar, 1984)   
 
Figure 2: Dominant political cultures by state (Elazar, 1984) 
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Sharkansky 
Sharkansky (1969) was one of the early scholars to subject Elazar’s theory to empirical 
testing, noting the cultures’ inability to “lend themselves to direct measurement”. Elazar’s 
continuum lays out the subcultures as follows: M, MI, IM, I, IT, TI, T, TM, with TM being the 
“bridge…between T and M” (Sharkansky, 1969, p. 70). Sharkansky criticizes the circular nature 
of Elazar’s continuum arguing that it is problematic to place TM higher than T, despite the fact 
that the “M” component should moderate the “T” component and sets about to correct it, 
resulting in the following scale: 
Table 1: Dominant political cultures by state (Elazar, 1984) 
M MT MI IM I IT TI TM T 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
This scale is based on the concept that T and M are opposites. Additionally, in each subculture 
with more than one of the three primary cultures, the first letter represents the dominant culture 
in the area while the second is of secondary importance (Sharkansky, 1969). 
 The next shortcoming that Sharkansky attempted to fix is Elazar’s lack of explanation of 
how the summary measures are devised in his mapping of dominant political culture by state 
(Sharkansky, 1969). He uses the formula below to compute the culture score for each state (C) 
with c equaling the value of a particular subculture in a certain state, and n equaling the total 
number of such subcultures found in that state.  
! = #$%	'/) 
The results are found in Table 2. Sharkansky did not include values for Alaska and Hawaii since 
Elazar’s initial work in 1966 did not include designations for them, citing lack of data. I have 
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used Sharkansky’s formula, and the updated subculture map in Elazar’s 1984 revision to 
compute the values for those two states and included them in Table 2 as well.  
Table 2: Each state’s score on the Sharkansky Political Culture scale 
Alabama 8.57 Louisiana 8.00 Ohio 5.16 
Alaska 6.33 Maine 2.33 Oklahoma 8.25 
Arizona 5.66 Maryland 7.00 Oregon 2.00 
Arkansas 9.00 Massachusetts 3.66 Pennsylvania 4.28 
California 3.55 Michigan 2.00 Rhode Island 3.00 
Colorado 1.80 Minnesota 1.00 S. Carolina 8.75 
Connecticut 3.00 Mississippi 9.00 S. Dakota 3.00 
Delaware 7.00 Missouri 7.66 Tennessee 8.50 
Florida 7.80 Montana 3.00 Texas 7.11 
Georgia 8.80 Nebraska 3.66 Utah 2.00 
Hawaii 8.25 Nevada 5.00 Vermont 2.33 
Idaho 2.50 New Hampshire 2.33 Virginia 7.86 
Illinois 4.72 New Jersey 4.00 Washington 1.66 
Indiana 6.33 New Mexico 7.00 W. Virginia 7.33 
Iowa 2.00 New York 3.62 Wisconsin 2.00 
Kansas 3.66 N. Carolina 8.50 Wyoming 4.00 
Kentucky 7.40 N. Dakota 2.00   
 
Lieske 
Aside from the addition of Alaska and Hawaii, the Elazar and Sharkansky classifications 
have remained the same since they were developed. There are many who criticize this and argue 
that Elazar’s classification fails to allow for new inputs, and that while culture is slow to change, 
it is not completely static and new migrants will eventually bring new views on the role of 
government (Leckrone, 2013). Many scholars have developed alternative classifiations, but 
Lieske’s (1993) has gained prominence as an adequate, if not superior, substitute. McCurdy 
(1998) says that Lieske’s theory is at least as effective as Elazar’s, and Avery, Lester, and Yang 
(2014, p. 113) go even further stating, “Lieske’s (2010) subcultures appear to outperform 
Elazar’s typology…in explaining a host of state variables”.  
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Regional Designations 
One of Lieske’s main criticisms of Elazar’s work is the “crudeness” of his regional 
designations (Lieske, 2010). He argues that regional subcultures are “conceptualized as a 
weighted sum of the racial–ethnic identifications, religious attachments, and social relationships 
that characterize a group of individuals who live in geographical proximity” (Lieske, 2010, p. 
541). He looked at a host of racial and ethnic, religious, and social structural indicators for his 
analysis. Structural indicators included differences in socioeconomic development, population 
size, urbanization, education, occupational status, family structure, social mobility, the age 
distribution, racial diversity, and income inequality (Lieske, 2010). He eventually developed 11 
regional subcultures: Nordic, Mormon, Anglo-French, Germanic, Heartland, Rurban, Global, 
Border, Blackbelt, Native American, and Latino which are assigned at the county level (see 
Appendix A). From this he derived an “eleven dimensional vector variable” that measures “the 
relative numerical strength of contending regional subcultures within each state” (Lieske, 2010, 
p. 544) (see Appendix B).  
Incorporating Changing Cultures 
Another of Lieske’s objections to Elazar’s typology was that it failed to allow for change. 
Lieske’s (1993) initial classification was based on data from the 1980 census and the 1980 
Glenmary (1982) Survey of Church bodies making it at least as current as Elazar’s (1984). But 
while the latter has remained essentially unchanged as mentioned above, Lieske (2010) revised 
his with data from the 2000 census and Glenmary Survey. Since Lieske’s measure is based on 
empirical data, it can continue to be updated as new survey data becomes availabe.  
Circularity 
 The final critique relevant to this analysis that Lieske (1993) makes of Elazar’s cultural 
classificaiton is its circularity. He believes it is problematic to “rely on past political behavior to 
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predict current or future political behavior” (Lieske, 1993, p. 889). When initially developing his 
subcultures he specifically only bases them on what he quotes Elazar as calling the “sources” of 
political culture: racial origin, ethnic ancestry, religious affiliation, and social structure (Lieske, 
1993). In doing so, he excludes the use of political behavior or instituational arrangements which 
he says will confound any new measure that incorporates them (1993) 
Multidimentional vs Unidimentional  
 Lieske (2012) argues that his model outperforms previous measures of political culture 
due to its multidimentional nature which allows for more precision. He also demonstrates how 
his measure can be aggregated to a unidmentional scale. This provides a more direct comparison 
to the Sharkansky/Elazar measure (see Fig. 3 and Table 3). The resulting scale for the three-fold 
measure is compared to the Sharkansky scale in Table 4. Lieske has reversed the scales, with 
traditionalistic on the lower end and moralistic on the higher end. However, the scale is not quite 
a mirror image of Sharkansky’s as he has also reversed the two values closest to each extreme of 
the continuum (TI/TM and MT/MI). 
Changing Political Culture and Felon Disenfranchisement Policies 
Behrens, Uggen & Manza (2003) and Preuhs (2001) agree that race, and specifically non-
white (or non-Anglo) population is an important factor in determining the restrictiveness of felon 
voting policies. However, it is not the only factor. After investigating several other possible 
explanations, Preuhs (2001) finds that the level of expertise or professionalism of the legislature 
also has a significant effect on the felon voting laws with more professional legislatures more 
likely to support less restrictive practices. Murphy, Ardoin, and Newmark (2006) also look at 
multiple possible alternatives and find that a state’s ideology as well as the proportion of their 
population that resides in urban areas also have a significant impact on felon disenfranchisement 
policies. More importantly, they discover the importance of political culture on felon 
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disenfranchisement, showing it to be the most important factor in determining policies (Murphy, 
Newmark, & Ardoin, 2006).  
In Murphy, Newmark, & Ardoin’s (2006) analysis however, the variable for minority 
population (percentage of the population that is non-white) is no longer a significant predictor of 
felon voting policies. It seems odd that the factor that scholars had previously found to be the 
most important predictor, no longer holds any significance in this analysis. However, the 
political culture variable that Murphy, Newmark, & Ardoin (2006) do find significant is not 
without racial implications. With Elazar’s (1984) original classification based off migration 
patterns and Lieske’s (2010) encompassing five indicators of racial origin and fourteen indicators 
of ethnic ancestry, clearly race remains a significant factor. With its incorporation of many of the 
demographic indicators that Murphy, Newmark, & Ardoin (2006) did not find significant as 
stand-alone variables, political culture becomes a stronger predictor of felon disenfranchisement 
policies than race alone. 
Interestingly, Preuhs (2001) also included a variable to represent what he called the “deep 
South explanation” for felon disenfranchisement. He draws from Elazar’s classification and 
theorizes that the former states of the Confederacy will have more “traditionalistic views about 
government and citizen participation” (p. 739) which will make them more likely to maintain 
more restrictive felon voting policies in order to keep the power in the hands of the white elite by 
repressing the African American vote. While the traditionalistic culture is specifically 
characterized as having the belief that participation should be limited to the elites and elites in 
the US have typically been white, the Preuhs (2001) analysis does not find the “deep South” 
variable to be statistically significant. This could possibly be because white racial bias, either 
explicit or implicit, does not affect only the traditionalistic culture, but all three. 
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The Murphy, Newmark, & Ardoin’s (2006) analysis uses Sharkansky’s (1969) scale of 
the Elazar (1984) classification of political culture yet, as mentioned earlier, Elazar’s typology 
has been criticized by Lieske (2010) and others (Heck, Lam, & Thomas, 2014) (Sharkansky, 
1969) as being outdated and non-empirical. While it has remained essentially unchanged since 
Elazar’s initial work in 1966, there have been numerous felon voting policy changes since 
Murphy, Newmark, and Ardoin’s (2006) work. If the Murphy, Newmark, and Ardoin analysis 
were to be replicated with more current data, would the Sharkansky/Elazar measure of political 
culture remain significant, or would Lieske’s measure be more appropriate? Since political 
culture is a key factor in understanding felon disenfranchisement policies, the recent policy 
changes would indicate that political culture has changed as well and the Sharkansky/Elazar 
measure would lose its significance over time. However, because Lieske has corrected this 
failure, if his measure were to be substituted for Sharkansky/Elazar’s in the Murphy, Newmark, 
& Ardoin analysis, not only would it be a better predictor in that data set, but it would continue 





Figure 3: Ranking and reduction of regional subcultures (Lieske, 2012) 
Table 3: Reduction of regional subculture by state 
State MIPBS MIPT MIT  State MIPBS MIPT MIT 
         
Alabama BP TP TI 
 
Montana P P I 
Alaska PS PT IT 
 
Nebraska PI PI I 
Arizona PS PT IT 
 
Nevada P P I 
Arkansas BP TP TI 
 
N Hampshire M M M 
California PS PT IT 
 
N Jersey PI PI I 
Colorado P P I 
 
N Mexico S T T 
Connecticut PM PM IM 
 
N York PI PI I 
Delaware P P I 
 
N Carolina BP TP TI 
Florida PI PI I 
 
N Dakota M M M 
Georgia BP TP TI 
 
Ohio IP IP I 
Hawaii P P I 
 
Oklahoma PB PT IT 
Idaho PM PM IM 
 
Oregon P P I 
Illinois PI PI I 
 
Pennsylvania IP IP I 
Indiana IP IP I 
 
Rhode Island M M M 
Iowa IP IP I 
 
S Carolina BP TP TI 
19 
Kansas PI PI I 
 
S Dakota MP MP MI 
Kentucky BP TP IT 
 
Tennessee BP TP TI 
Louisiana BM TM TM 
 
Texas PS PT IT 
Maine MP MP MI 
 
Utah M M M 
Maryland P P I 
 
Vermont M M M 
Massachusetts MP MP MI 
 
Virginia PB PT IT 
Michigan IP IP I 
 
Washington P P I 
Minnesota MP MP MI 
 
W Virginia IP IP I 
Mississippi BP TP TI 
 
Wisconsin IM IM IM 
Missouri P P IT 
 
Wyoming P P I 
 
MIPBS: M-Moralistic; I-Individualistic; P-Pluralistic; B-Bifurcated; S-Separatist 
MIPT: M-Moralistic; I-Individualistic; P-Pluralistic; T-Traditionalistic 
MIT: M-Moralistic; I-Individualistic; T-Traditionalistic 
 
Table 4: Sharkansky vs Lieske three-fold subculture scale 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Sharkansky M MT MI IM I IT TI TM T 
Lieske T TI TM IT I IM MT MI M 
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CHAPTER 3.    RESEARCH DESIGN 
As in the Murphy, Newmark, & Ardoin (2006) analysis, due to the ordinal nature of the 
dependent variable, I used ordered logistic regression to determine the impact of political culture 
on policy restrictiveness using data mainly from the 2000 census or other sources published that 
year. I also performed additional analyses at three later points in time, 2005, 2010, and 2015. I 
ran the analyses using the Elazar/Sharkansky classification first, then again substituting Lieske’s 
version. All of the variables used by Murphy, Newmark, & Ardoin (2006) were included in the 
initial model with a few modifications that I will describe below.  
 Dependent Variable 
Murphy, Newmark, & Ardoin (2006) chose to divide felony voting policies into four 
categories, states that do not deprive felons of voting priviledges at all, states with restrictions 
while they are in prison, while on parole, or while on probation or beyond. This lumps 31 states 
in to the most restrictive category, and despite the fact that there are distinct differences between 
the policies of these states I have followed this categorization as well in order to more clearly 
investigate the effect of substituting Lieske’s political cutlure measure for the Elazar/Sharkansky 
measure. To allow for a legislation delay as in the Murphy, Newmark, & Ardoin analysis, the 
policies used in each analysis are those in place four years after the independent variables 
bringing us to the most current policies. These categories are coded on a 4 point ordinal scale 




Table 5: Policy Restrictiveness 2004 (The Sentencing Project, 2006) (McLeod, 2018) 
2004 
0 1 2 3 
None While Incarcerated While on Parole While on Probation or beyond 
    
Maine Hawaii California Alabama Louisiana Rhode Island 
Vermont Illinois Colorado Alaska Maryland S. Carolina 
  Indiana Connecticut Arizona Minnesota Tennessee 
  Massachusetts New York Arkansas Mississippi Texas 
  Michigan S. Dakota Delaware Missouri Utah 
  Montana   Florida Nebraska Virginia 
  New Hampshire   Georgia Nevada Washington 
  N. Dakota   Idaho New Jersey W. Virginia 
  Ohio   Iowa New Mexico Wisconsin 
  Oregon   Kansas N. Carolina Wyoming 
  Pennsylvania   Kentucky Oklahoma 
 
 
Table 6: Policy Restrictiveness 2009 (The Sentencing Project, 2010) 
2009 
0 1 2 3 
None While Incarcerated While on Parole While on Probation or beyond 
    
Maine Hawaii California Alabama Kentucky N. Carolina 
Vermont Illinois Colorado Alaska Louisiana Oklahoma 
  Indiana Connecticut Arizona Maryland S. Carolina 
  Massachusetts New York Arkansas Minnesota Tennessee 
  Michigan S. Dakota Delaware Mississippi Texas 
  Montana   Florida Missouri Virginia 
  New Hampshire   Georgia Nebraska Washington 
  N. Dakota   Idaho Nevada W. Virginia 
  Ohio   Iowa New Jersey Wisconsin 
  Oregon   Kansas New Mexico Wyoming 
  Pennsylvania   
   
  Rhode Island   
   
  Utah   
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Table 7: Policy Restrictiveness 2014 (Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, 
2014) 
2014 
0 1 2 3 
None While Incarcerated While on Parole While on Probation or beyond 
    
Maine Hawaii California Alabama Louisiana Oklahoma 
Vermont Illinois Colorado Alaska Maryland S. Carolina 
  Indiana Connecticut Arizona Minnesota S. Dakota 
  Massachusetts New York Arkansas Mississippi Tennessee 
  Michigan   Delaware Missouri Texas 
  Montana   Florida Nebraska Virginia 
  New Hampshire   Georgia Nevada Washington 
  N. Dakota   Idaho New Jersey W. Virginia 
  Ohio   Iowa New Mexico Wisconsin 
  Oregon   Kansas N. Carolina Wyoming 
  Pennsylvania   Kentucky   
  Rhode Island   
 
  Utah   
   
 
Table 8: Policy Restrictiveness 2019 (Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws Across the United 
States, 2018) 
2019 
0 1 2 3 
None While Incarcerated While on Parole While on Probation or beyond 
    
Maine Hawaii California Alabama Kentucky Oklahoma 
Vermont Illinois Colorado Alaska Maryland S. Carolina 
  Indiana Connecticut Arizona Minnesota S. Dakota 
  Massachusetts Louisiana Arkansas Mississippi Tennessee 
  Michigan   Delaware Missouri Texas 
  Montana   Florida Nebraska Virginia 
  New Hampshire   Georgia Nevada Washington 
  New York   Idaho New Jersey W. Virginia 
  North Dakota   Iowa New Mexico Wisconsin 
  Ohio   Kansas N. Carolina Wyoming 
  Oregon   
   
  Pennsylvania   
   
  Rhode Island   
   
  Utah   






Political culture. For the political culture variable, as previously mentioned, I have used 
Sharkansky’s (1969) continuum of the Elazar (1984) typology, and then substituted Lieske’s 
(2010) measure for comparison. This is coded on a nine-point scale ranging from 0 to 8. The 
lower values represent the more traditionalistic cultures where more restrictive policies can be 
expected, and the higher values represent the moralistic cultures where the least restritive 
policies should be found. It is important to remember that this is the reverse of Sharkansky’s 
(1969) nine-point scale of Elazar’s (1984) typology that ranges from 1 to 9 and has higher values 
associated with traditionalistic cultures while lower valuse are associated with moralisitc 
cultures.  
Table 9: Comparison of political culture score by state: Sharkansky/Elazar vs. Lieske 
State Sharkansky Elazar State Sharkansky Elazar 
Alaska 6.33 4.00 Nebraska 3.66 5.00 
Arizona 5.66 4.00 Nevada 5.00 5.00 
Arkansas 9.00 2.00 New Hampshire 2.33 9.00 
California 3.55 4.00 New Jersey 4.00 5.00 
Colorado 1.80 5.00 New Mexico 7.00 1.00 
Connecticut 3.00 6.00 New York 3.62 5.00 
Delaware 7.00 5.00 North Carolina 8.50 2.00 
Florida 7.80 5.00 North Dakota 2.00 9.00 
Georgia 8.80 2.00 Ohio 5.16 5.00 
Hawaii 8.25 5.00 Oklahoma 8.25 4.00 
Idaho 2.50 6.00 Oregon 2.00 5.00 
Illinois 4.72 5.00 Pennsylvania 4.28 5.00 
Indiana 6.33 5.00 Rhode Island 3.00 9.00 
Iowa 2.00 5.00 South Carolina 8.75 2.00 
Kansas 3.66 5.00 South Dakota 3.00 8.00 
Kentucky 7.40 4.00 Tennessee 8.50 1.00 
Louisiana 8.00 3.00 Texas 7.11 4.00 
Maine 2.33 8.00 Utah 2.00 9.00 
Maryland 7.00 5.00 Vermont 2.33 9.00 
Massachusetts 3.66 8.00 Virginia 7.86 4.00 
Michigan 2.00 5.00 Washington 1.66 5.00 
Minnesota 1.00 8.00 West Virginia 7.33 5.00 
Mississippi 9.00 2.00 Wisconsin 2.00 6.00 




Citizen ideology. Pinaire, Heumann, & Bilotta (2003) investigate public opinions on 
felony disenfranchisement and find that 81.7 percent of those surveyed favored the restoration of 
voting rights “at some point” while the individual is serving their sentence.  Manza, Brooks & 
Uggen (2004) report similar findings from a survey they conducted which showed that between 
52 and 80 percent of respondents support voting rights for ex-felons (the variation being in the 
framing of survey questions, whether generalized or offense specific). One would expect public 
opinion in the form of general citizen ideology to have some impact on felon disenfranchisement 
policy. States with a more liberal ideology should have less restrictive policies while states with 
a more conservative ideology should have more restrictive policies. The citzen ideology measure 
was taken from Erikson, Wright, & McIver’s Statehouse Democracy (1993, p. 18) and is coded 
on a 4 point scale ranging from 1 to 4. The lower values indicate more conservative states where 
we would predict more restrictive policies, while the higer values are more liberal and should 
coincide with less restrictive policies. 
Party competition. Murphy, Newmark, & Ardoin (2006) lay out a logical argument for 
considering the impact the level of party competition may have on felon voting policies. They 
suggest that when electoral competition is high, politicians will want to appear tough on crime, 
resulting in stricter policies. Johnson (1976) finds a statistically significant correlation between 
political culture and party competition which would potentially warrant the exclusion of one or 
the other to avoid multicollinearity. However, since there is not yet any evidence of correlation 
between party competition and Lieske’s metric, and Lieske does not use political behavior as an 
input in determining political culture I have included it in the analysis. Party competition 
measures were taken from the Raney Index. I used Klarner’s (2013) folded 4 year average. 
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Values closer to 1 indicate the more competitive states where we should expect to see more 
restrictive policies.  
Demographic Variables 
Minority population. Works mentioned earlier (Behens, Uggen, & Manza, 2003) 
(Preuhs, 2001) established minority population as a significant predictor of the severity of felon 
disenfranchisement policies. Both discuss the influence of racial threat on these policies, arguing 
that states with larger minority populations will establish policies that block the influence of 
these minorities and maintain the status quo. Since the prison population is comprised of a 
disproportionately high percentage of minorities, felons provide a legal target for exclusion that 
has the ultimate effect of watering down the minority vote. We should therefore expect to find 
stricter laws in states that have a higher minority population percentage. Murphy, Newmark, & 
Ardoin (2006) do not find a significant relationship between minority population as a stand-alone 
variable. Preuhs (2001, p. 738) briefly discusses a “variant on the racial threat hypothesis” which 
“predicts a curvilinear relationship in which white resistance increases at first, then diminishes as 
minorities become sufficiently powerful to induce coalition building or attain outright control of 
political institutions”. This could help to explain why the minority population variable has lost its 
significance since the earlier works. Data for minority population percentage is pulled from the 
US Census website and is the percentage of the state’s non-Hispanic or Latino, “white alone” 
population. 
Incarceration rates. A relationship between incarceration rates and felon voting policies 
could be expected for several reasons. High incarceration rates are usually indicative of high 
crime in a particular state, harsher criminal justice policies, or both. The assumption by Murphy, 
Newmark, & Ardoin (2006) and many scholars is that the expectation for policy makers to be 
tough on crime would translate to stricter felon disenfranchisement policies as well, however, all 
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of those mentioned here fail to find a strong association. As mentioned earlier, both Pinaire, 
Heumann, & Bilotta (2003) and Manza, Brooks & Uggen (2004) find that public opinion leans 
toward restoration of voting rights post sentence, so while the public does expect their 
policymakers to punish crime, once that punishment is over they do not seem to see the need for 
that punitiveness to continue. Because of this, I would be more inclined to predict higher 
incarceration rates will produce less restrictive laws. Data for incarceration rates was pulled from 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics website.  
Urban population. Similar to the reasoning behind incarceration rates being related to 
felon voting policies, one could expect the percentage of a state’s population that resides in urban 
areas to also be related. Murphy, Newmark, & Ardoin (2006) suggest that in states with a larger 
percentage residing in urban areas, you can expect more problems with crime, and as a result of 
that harsher criminal justice laws. However, again, I disagree. While it is possible that there may 
be harsher criminal justice laws in high crime areas, the large number of offenders will 
eventually need to reintegrate into the community. Post sentence penalties such as 
disenfranchisement present roadblocks to effective reintegration so I would expect policies to be 
less restrictive in states with more urban areas. Data for urban population is pulled from the US 
Census website and is the percentage of a state’s population residing in urban areas.  
Educational attainment. While there is disagreement among scholars as to whether 
there is a causal relationship between educational attainment and political participation, many 
tend to agree that there is a relationship. In fact, a simple look at data from the census bureau will 
show that higher educational attainment reflects higher voter turnout. Since those with more 
education are more likely to vote, they may also be less inclined to withhold the vote from 
others. Also, Preuhs (2001) argues that more professional legislatures would have more 
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knowledge of the impact of these policies and so be less likely to have severe restrictions. 
Therefore, we should expect to see less restrictive policies in states with higher percentages of 
college graduates. Data for educational attainment was pulled from the US Census website and is 
the percentage of the state’s population with at least a four-year college degree. 
Age. Finally, some consider that age may be a factor. Murphy, Newmark, & Ardoin 
(2006) argue that senior citizens fear violent crime more than other age groups and would likely 
exert pressure through such organizations as the AARP for stricter disenfranchisement policies. 
In a report to the US Department of Justice, Skogan (1978) states that this fear stems from the 
fact that they have “fewer resources for coping with victimization”. However, this demographic 
has dramatically changed since Skogan’s report, and even since Murphy, Newmark, & Ardoin 
published in 2006. While it is true that cases of elder abuse and neglect are on the rise, and will 
likely continue to be, as that demographic continues to expand, so has the diversity of those 
included in the >65 age group (Blowers, 2015). Many now included in that age group are still 
active and not as vulnerable as they may have been in 1978. I do not believe this would be a 
significant factor in determining felon disenfranchisement policies but have included it in the full 
model to remain consistent with the variables used in the Murphy, Newmark, & Ardoin (2006) 
analysis. Data for age was pulled from the US Census website and is he percentage of the state’s 
population age 65 or older. 




Political Culture (Sharkansky) (Sharkansky, 1969, p. 72) 
Political Culture (Lieske) (Lieske, 2012, p. 128) 
Citizen Ideology (Erikson, Wright, & McIver, 1993, p. 18) 
Party Competition (Klarner, 2013) 
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Minority Population 
American Fact Finder, US Census Website: Profile of General Demographic 
Characteristics 
Incarceration Rates Bureau of Justice Statistics Website: Quick Tables: Imprisonment Rates 
Urban Population American Fact Finder, US Census Website: Urban and Rural 2000/2010 
Educational Attainment 
American Fact Finder, US Census Website: Educational Attainment by Sex 2000 
American Fact Finder, US Census Website: Educational Attainment 2005/2010/2015 
Age 
American Fact Finder, US Census Website: Profile of General Demographic 
Characteristics: 2000 
American Fact Finder, US Census Website: Population 65 Years of Age and Over in 
the US 2005/2010/2015 
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CHAPTER 4.    FINDINGS 
Full Models (I and II) 
By substituting Lieske’s (2010) political culture metric for the Sharkansky (1969)/Elazar 
(1984) measure we see an improvement in the significance of several of the predictor variables, 
even in the full model with the data from 2005, 2010, and 2015. With the data from 2000, the 
model using the Sharkansky/Elazar metric was slightly stronger overall, with RSquare (U) of 
0.2569 while the Lieske metric was at 0.2479. Both the political culture and urbanization 
variables are significant at the .05 level in the Sharkansky/Elazar model (I) while only the citizen 
ideology variable is significant at the same level in the Lieske model (II), although political 
culture and urbanization are approach significance at 0.0552 and 0.0506 respectively. However, 
this is the only model in which the Sharkansky/Elazar model (I) outperforms the Lieske model 
(II). Running the full model at each of the later dates, the RSquared (U) is 0.0593 higher in the 
Lieske model (II) in 2005, 0.0665 higher in 2010, and 0.0631 higher in 2015. None of the 
predictor variables remain significant in the Sharkansky/Elazar model (I) at the later dates, the 
2005 political culture the only one coming close at 0.0564. In contrast, the 2005 political culture 
variable in the Lieske model (II) becomes significant even at the .01 level, and then remains 
highly significant at the .05 level in both 2010 and 2015. Citizen ideology loses its significance 
over time, nearing significance in 2005 and 2010 but not in 2015. Urbanization also loses 
significance after the 2000 data, while the party competition variable actually begins to approach 
significance in the 2010 and 2015 data. Therefore, based on the full model, while we cannot say 
currently that the Sharkansky/Elazar measure of political culture can effectively predict the 
restrictiveness felon disenfranchisement policies, the most current data continues to show that 
Lieske’s metric is still a strong predictor.  
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Table 11: Whole model test Models I and II 
 Sharkansky/Elazar (I) Lieske (II) 
2000 
RSquare (U) 0.2202 RSquare (U) 0.2359 
AICc 89.9508 AICc 88.4791 
BIC 100.249 BIC 98.7775 
2005 
RSquare (U) 0.2424 RSquare (U) 0.3009 
AICc 90.9151 AICc 85.1952 
BIC 101.213 BIC 95.4936 
2010 
RSquare (U) 0.2334 RSquare (U) 0.2936 
AICc 88.9119 AICc 83.2478 
BIC 99.2103 BIC 93.5462 
2015 
RSquare (U) 0.1758 RSquare (U) 0.2362 
AICc 95.7465 AICc 89.9605 
BIC 106.045 BIC 100.259 
 
Table 12: Parameter Estimates Model I and II 
  
Sharkansky/Elazar (I) Lieske (II) 
2000 2005 2010 2015 2000 2005 2010 2015 
CI 0.2520 0.5759 0.4250 0.9184 0.0472* 0.0727* 0.0623* 0.1925 
PC 0.0340** 0.0564* 0.1960 0.2262 0.0552* 0.0095*** 0.0144* 0.0199* 
MP 0.6209 0.8278 0.4717 0.4881 0.6818 0.7954 0.968 0.8467 
>65 0.3223 0.9868 0.9613 0.7715 0.7714 0.7284 0.7011 0.7671 
IR 0.9953 0.1605 0.1939 0.5356 0.7699 0.8584 0.9593 0.7958 
CG 0.1885 0.8297 0.6982 0.3284 0.5253 0.5756 0.8207 0.8434 
Urb 0.0408** 0.5318 0.8279 0.8343 0.0506* 0.4568 0.5881 0.4867 
Pcomp 0.4905 0.4427 0.2333 0.2227 0.5648 0.6032 0.0907* 0.0709* 
 
Reduced Models (III-V) 
In order to get a stronger model, Murphy, Newmark, & Ardoin (2006) regress the policy 
variable against a reduced number of predictor variables: political culture, citizen ideology, the 
percentage of urban population, and incarceration rate. While this creates a slightly weaker 
overall model using the Elazar metric (III) with the RSquared (U) dropping between .0288 and 
.0393 over the different data sets, it does achieve stronger predictor variables. Political culture 
remains significant at the .05 level through 2010 but drops to significance at only the .10 level in 
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2015. Citizen ideology becomes significant at the .05 level, but only in the 2000 data set, and 
percentage of urban population follows the same pattern. Incarceration rate also shows some 
improvement but is only significant at the .10 level in 2005.  
Table 13: Whole Model Test Models III and IV 
  
Sharkansky/Elazar (III) Lieske (IV) 
2000 2005 2010 2015 2000 2005 2010 2015 
CI 0.0453** 0.2638 0.1326 0.2368 0.0065*** 0.0300** 0.0189** 0.0434** 
PC 0.0250** 0.0189** 0.0454** 0.0756* 0.0227** 0.0060*** 0.0088*** 0.0128** 
IR 0.6757 0.0946* 0.1795 0.4138 0.5736 0.8800 0.6683 0.5759 
Urb 0.0332** 0.2300 0.1552 0.1680 0.0316** 0.2475 0.1944 0.2723 
 
Table 14: Parameter Estimates Models III and IV 
  Sharkansky/Elazar (III) Lieske (IV) 
2000 
RSquare (U) 0.2202 RSquare (U) 0.2359 
AICc 89.9508 AICc 88.4791 
BIC 100.249 BIC 98.7775 
2005 
RSquare (U) 0.2424 RSquare (U) 0.3009 
AICc 90.9151 AICc 85.1952 
BIC 101.213 BIC 95.4936 
2010 
RSquare (U) 0.2334 RSquare (U) 0.2936 
AICc 88.9119 AICc 83.2478 
BIC 99.2103 BIC 93.5462 
2015 
RSquare (U) 0.1758 RSquare (U) 0.2362 
AICc 95.7465 AICc 89.9605 
BIC 106.045 BIC 100.259 
 
Using the Lieske metric (IV), we see a similar drop in the overall strength when 
compared with the full model, with RSquared (U) dropping between .0080 and .0420. However, 
again, we have much stronger predictor variables. Citizen ideology is significant at the .01 level 
in 2000 and remains significant at the .05 level in each of the later data sets. Political culture is 
significant at the .05 level in 2000, becomes significant at the .01 level in 2005 and 2010 before 
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dropping back to the .05 level in 2015. Similar to the Sharkansky/Elazar metric, percentage of 
urban population is significant at the .05 level only in 2000. Finally using the Lieske metric, 
incarceration fails to be a significant predictor. From the outset, I questioned the inclusion of 
incarceration rate in the reduced model because of its lack of significance in both full models. 
Because it fails to gain significance at the .05 level in either of the reduced models, I have 
eliminated it and replaced it with party competition in a final reduced model (V) using the Lieske 
political culture metric. The decision to include party competition is due to the fact that it is 
significant at the .10 level in the 2010 and 2015 data sets using the Lieske political culture 
metric. 
The overall strength of the final reduced model (V) remains very similar to the full model 
using the Lieske metric (II), with variations only between .0023 and .0101. Political culture 
remains highly significant, being the most significant variable with p-values below .01 in all of 
the data sets. Citizen ideology is significant at the .05 level from 2005-2010, only dropping to 
significance at the .10 level in 2015. Percentage of urban population continues to be significant 
at the .05 level only in the 2000 data set. Similar to the full model (II), party competition 




Table 15: Whole Model Test and Parameter Estimates Model V 
 Final Reduced (V)  
  
Final Reduced (V) 
2000 
RSquare (U) 0.2378  2000 2005 2010 2015 
AICc 88.3033  CI 0.0153** 0.0300** 0.0240** 0.0661* 
BIC 98.6017  PC 0.0041*** <.0001*** <.0001*** 0.0005** 
2005 
RSquare (U) 0.3038  P Comp 0.5214 0.5780 0.0912* 0.0673* 
AICc 84.9098  Urb 0.0359** 0.2883 0.4128 0.5340 
BIC 95.2082       
2010 
RSquare (U) 0.3264       
AICc 80.1646       
BIC 90.463       
2015 
RSquare (U) 0.2756       
AICc 86.1856       
BIC 96.484       
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CHAPTER 5.    CONCLUSION 
Overall, I have shown that using the Lieske (2010) metric for political culture creates a 
stronger model for determining felon disenfranchisement policies than the older Elazar 
(1984)/Sharkansky (1969) metric. It is important to recognize that while Elazar’s (1984) very 
definition of political culture describes policy patterns that are “embedded” in a political system, 
this does not mean they are completely resistant to change. The fact that Elazar’s (1984) political 
culture fails to remain a significant predictor of felon disenfranchisement policies in the later 
data sets while Lieske’s (2010) version remains a highly significant predictor suggests political 
culture is indeed changing, and that Lieske’s (2010) measure reflects current political culture 
more accurately. Additionally, we see that political culture not only has the greatest effect on 
felon disenfranchisement policies overall, but that the Lieske (2010) metric has a greater effect 
than the Elazar (1984)/Sharkansky (1969) metric. 
Of the remaining political variables, citizen ideology also has a highly significant effect 
on felon disenfranchisement policies. Again, its effect is stronger in the Lieske model over the 
Elazar model in the one year where they are both significant and maintains its significance in the 
later data sets. Party competition also has a stronger effect in the Lieske model than the Elazar 
model, but is only significant at the .10 level in the latest two data sets so it is still a very weak 
effect. Since the Elazar metric incorporates past political behavior to determine political culture 
it is possible that there is a problem with multicollinearity in the Murphy, Newmark, & Ardoin 
model which partially hides the effect of these other two political variables. The fact that Lieske 
corrects Elazar’s circularity problem, making his measure of political culture distinctly different 
from the other political variables, solves this issue.  
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Similar to the Murphy, Newmark, & Ardoin analysis, almost none of the demographic 
variables have a significant effect on felon voting policies. They take this to indicate these 
variables are not related to the restrictiveness of felon disenfranchisement policies or have very 
little effect. However, as I have demonstrated, political culture is actually a complex blending of 
all of these variables. When they are taken as a whole, especially in the more powerful Lieske 
measure, they have a highly significant impact on the felon voting policies.  
With 6.1M potential votes affected, these policies clearly have far reaching effects on the 
composition of the federal, state, and local governments in our nation, and so they continue to be 
a point of contention in the US. In Florida, where historically there have been some of the most 
restrictive policies, voters passed a ballot initiative in November 2018 which amends the state 
constitution and restores the right to vote to most felons upon completion of their sentence. In 
May 2019 a measure passed both chambers of the Florida legislature requiring all court-ordered 
fines, fees, and restitution be paid before voting rights are restored (Gardner, 2019). Many argue 
that this is the equivalent to a poll tax and would effectively limit the scope of what voters 
intended in passing Amendment 4 (Gardner, 2019). The Elazar (1984)/Sharkansky (1969) 
measure has Florida at 7.8 very close to the score of 9 that represents the most traditionalistic end 
of the continuum. The updated Lieske (2010) measure puts Florida at 5, and remembering the 
scales are reversed, puts Florida closer to the score of 8 that represents the most moralistic end of 
the continuum and supports the argument that political culture in Florida is changing. It is 
concerning when a state’s legislature enacts a law restricting a constitutional amendment passed 
by its voters, however, I would argue that this is an example of a changing political culture that 
has reached voters but is not yet reflected in their elected officials.  
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Despite the ongoing controversy in Florida, the initial success of the initiative put 
pressure on Iowa to reform their lifetime felon voting ban. Gov. Kim Reynolds has since called 
on legislators to amend their state constitution to restore voting rights to those “who deserve a 
second chance” (Gruber-Miller, 2019). While the Iowa House of Representatives passed an 
amendment that would automatically re-enfranchise felons once they have completed their 
sentence including any parole or probation, the state senate denied a vote due to vague language 
about who exactly would be eligible (Gruber-Miller, 2019). In March 2019, Louisiana restored 
the right to vote for felons released from incarceration at least 5 years prior, regardless if they are 
still on probation or parole. The implementation of the legislation in Louisiana is expected to be 
cumbersome, requiring forms to be completed that are not yet available (Joseph, 2019). The 
Moral Turpitude Act of 2017 passed in Alabama specified a list of 46 offenses that precluded a 
felon from voting, clarifying previous ambiguity that prevented other felons from voting, but 
many affected were unaware the law was passed and they were eligible to vote (Yawn, 2019). 
Since political culture has the greatest impact on felon disenfranchisement policies, all of 
these examples of changing policies clearly support changing political culture. What is also 
consistent in all of these examples is that while the change has reached some, it has not reached 
all. Roadblocks are experienced at multiple steps of the policy process such as problem 
identification, agenda setting, policy making, and implementation. Is it possible then, to speed up 
change in political culture to overcome these roadblocks? Again, Elazar’s definition of 
“embedded” policy patterns implies slow change, but still change, and any change can be 
catalyzed by certain actions. Examples of such catalysts can be as simple as everyday people 
who feel strongly enough to raise their voice on the issue. Others would be political activist 
organizations such as The Sentencing Project, Brennan Center for Justice, and FairVote that 
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advocate for the reform of felon disenfranchisement policies. Also providing this catalyst are the 
scholars mentioned in this paper, as well as many others, who continue to research and publish 
on the issue.  
Looking forward, while I have shown that the Lieske metric is an improvement on the 
Sharkansky/Elazar metric, there is the potential for future research on how racial attitudes affect 
each of the three political cultures. Also, since the Lieske metric was last updated using 2000 
census data, it would be beneficial to revise the metric using the most current census data to find 
if political culture continues to be a reliable predictor of felon disenfranchisement policies. 
Another important thing to note is that while there have been many changes reducing the 
restrictiveness of felon disenfranchisement policies in the past two decades, a great number of 
them are still in the most severe category for the purposes of this study leaving room for future 
work with a more detailed dependent variable. My initial analysis attempted a more detailed 
dependent variable, but it failed to produce any significant results. Since my analysis uses the 
unidimensional reduction of Lieske’s classification, perhaps a more complicated analysis using 
the multidimensional vector variable would produce significant results with the more detailed 
dependent variable and give us an even better predictor of felon disenfranchisement policies.  
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APPENDIX A.    REGIONAL SUBCULTUERS OF THE US (Lieske, 2010) 
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APPENDIX B.    PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF REGIONAL SUBCULTURES; BY 
























French Alabama    38.59   42.51   18.90  
Alaska        10.35  89.65  
Arizona  11.49    59.88  3.25  25.38  
Arkansas    55.59   16.04   28.38  
California  22.44    58.43   0.05 19.08  
Colorado 0.30 6.64        93.06  
Connecticut      75.28     24.72 
Delaware          100.00  
Dist. Of Col.       100.00     
Florida  0.60  3.51  43.91 0.56  10.07 41.35  
Georgia    13.13   50.76   36.12  
Hawaii  4.83    72.32  0.01  22.85  
Idaho  0.66   26.12    1.00 72.23  
Illinois 8.97   0.68  43.29 2.20  36.70 8.17  
Indiana 36.32        28.34 35.34  
Iowa 14.10  8.66      38.49 38.75  
Kansas 32.02 4.02     5.87  2.96 55.14  
Kentucky 10.98   48.44      40.59  
Louisiana    46.82   43.05   3.38 48.90 
Maine          12.68 87.32 
Maryland    1.98  58.16 3.01  8.42 28.44  
Mass      44.19     55.81 
Michigan   1.51   32.76   53.66 11.01 1.07 
Minnesota   77.02     0.11 3.43 19.44  
Mississipi    26.98   55.44   16.08 1.51 
Missouri 11.50   17.26   6.58  8.39 56.27  
Montana 0.66  4.59     4.83 1.27 88.65  
Nebraska 3.23  3.20 0.17    0.42 34.13 58.86  
Nevada  3.70   0.21 68.85    27.25  
N Hampshire           100.00 
New Jersey      77.77   22.23   
New Mexico  93.62      4.11  2.27  
New York      63.48   27.21 2.31 7.00 
N. Carolina 1.73   16.60   33.71  3.59 44.37  
N. Dakota   91.28     3.84 4.61 0.26  
Ohio 6.71   0.61  12.28   46.42 33.97  
Oklahoma 6.33 0.58  39.86      53.22  
Oregon  0.92        99.08  
Pennsylvania 0.33     18.47   76.23 4.97  
Rhode Island           100.00 
S. Carolina    9.85   57.33   32.82  
S. Dakota   56.05     7.78 12.63 23.54  
Tennessee 1.88   48.96   19.21   29.94  
Texas  25.32  14.18  16.31 1.53  0.65 42.00  
Utah     98.98   0.65  0.38  
Vermont           100.00 
Virginia 3.19   7.84  13.85 26.43 0.30 2.40 46.00  
Washington 0.04 6.16        93.80  
W. Virginia 77.21   5.44     6.29 11.05  
Wisconsin   11.10     0.09 80.86 7.95  
Wyoming  7.62   6.95     85.43  
 
